Emmanuel Combe Academic Steering Committee University of Paris I Panthéon-SorbonneContact
Emmanuel Combe is a specialist in competition, cartels, antitrust, air transport and new economic models, he has published numerous articles and books on these subjects, such as "Economie et politique de la concurrence" (2020, Dalloz). He is the author of several articles and conferences for Concurrences. He has published several studies for Fondapol, including "Vers des prix personnalisés à l’heure du numérique" (2019), "Souveraineté économique, entre désirs et réalité" (2021). Emmanuel Combe was previously the vice-president of the French Competition Authority. Emmanuel Combe is an alumnus of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (LSH), Agrégé de sciences sociales, PhD in economics and Agrégé des Facultés de droit et sciences économiques. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris 1 (on secondment) and Professor at Skema Business School, he is also currently a senior advisor at Image 7. Additionally, Emmanuel Combe is the co-editor of the Dictionnaire de droit de la concurrence, to be published by Concurrences.
See his website: https://www.emmanuelcombe.fr/
Fight Against Cartels and Behaviour of ManagersThe initiative of Mr. Combe and Mrs. Monnier-Schlumberger consists of the article "Fight against cartels and behaviour of managers." Developed following the pioneering work of Gary Becker (1968), the economics of crime has mainly been mobilized in antitrust to analyze a firm’s decision to engage in a cartel: according to this approach, a firm is induced to form a cartel when the illicit gain resulting from this practice exceeds its expected cost, which depends both on the anticipated sanction and the probability of detection/conviction (see e.g. Connor and Lande  for a synthesis of the literature). This approach, which focuses on legal persons (the company being considered as a single, global entity), however, leaves aside the question of the specific incentives for "managers" to engage in collusive practices, incentives which may not be aligned with those of shareholders or, conversely, may reinforce the latter’s interest in violating antitrust rules.
Managerial Behaviour and Competition lawThis On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law infringements. It reviews the tools available to prevent these violations, in particular through compliance programs and individual sanctions. This set brings together contributions from practitioners, researchers and academics identifying advances and new issues on this innovative subject.