The initiative of Mr. Combe and Mrs. Monnier-Schlumberger consists of the article "Fight against cartels and behaviour of managers." Developed following the pioneering work of Gary Becker (1968), the economics of crime has mainly been mobilized in antitrust to analyze a firm’s decision to engage in a cartel: according to this approach, a firm is induced to form a cartel when the illicit gain resulting from this practice exceeds its expected cost, which depends both on the anticipated sanction and the probability of detection/conviction (see e.g. Connor and Lande [2012] for a synthesis of the literature). This approach, which focuses on legal persons (the company being considered as a single, global entity), however, leaves aside the question of the specific incentives for "managers" to engage in collusive practices, incentives which may not be aligned with those of shareholders or, conversely, may reinforce the latter’s interest in violating antitrust rules.

This On-Topic set of articles discusses the role of managers in the commission of competition law infringements. It reviews the tools available to prevent these violations, in particular through compliance programs and individual sanctions. This set brings together contributions from practitioners, researchers and academics identifying advances and new issues on this innovative subject.

Mr Parleani’s initiative consists of an article on Transparency, Compliance, and Trouble Makers: "Admittedly, the "major law" of competition does not require any written formalization of relations between economic agents. But the authorities are today encouraging a formalism that could be insidious, by promoting the implementation of codes of good conduct, compliance, or "compliance". How can we worry about this when the "compliance" movement seems general? But maybe that’s where the problem lies. Beware of false symmetries."