The initiative of Mr. Combe and Mrs. Monnier-Schlumberger consists of the article "Fight against cartels and behaviour of managers." Developed following the pioneering work of Gary Becker (1968), the economics of crime has mainly been mobilized in antitrust to analyze a firm’s decision to engage in a cartel: according to this approach, a firm is induced to form a cartel when the illicit gain resulting from this practice exceeds its expected cost, which depends both on the anticipated sanction and the probability of detection/conviction (see e.g. Connor and Lande [2012] for a synthesis of the literature). This approach, which focuses on legal persons (the company being considered as a single, global entity), however, leaves aside the question of the specific incentives for "managers" to engage in collusive practices, incentives which may not be aligned with those of shareholders or, conversely, may reinforce the latter’s interest in violating antitrust rules.